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Lobbying is a widespread phenomenon with considerable impact on political pro-
cesses. Concerns regarding lobbyists’ influence on policy outcomes are even used
during elections to attract votes. For instance, during the 2008 United States presi-
dential election both Barack Obama (”I’m in this race to tell the lobbyists in Wash-
ington that their days of setting the agenda are over.”1) and John McCain (”I’ve
fought lobbyists who stole from Indian tribes.”2) promised the electorate that they
would reduce the clout of lobbies as soon as they took office. The pervasiveness of
lobbying is illustrated by the observation that in 1999 3,835 organizations had regis-
tered with the U.S. government as political action committees, i.e. as organizations
which are allowed to contribute to political candidates.3
It is therefore not surprising that lobbying has garnered generous attention in
the political economy literature over the past few decades. A substantial literature,
pioneered by Becker (1983), studies how exogenously given special interest groups
can affect policy outcomes by lobbying governments (cf. Grossman and Helpman,
1994, Dixit et al., 1997, Aidt, 1998). More recent work (Grossman and Helpman,
1996, Besley and Coate, 2001, Prat, 2002, amongst others) takes into account that
such lobbying impacts political competition. A few papers investigate endogenous
lobbying or endogenous lobby formation. Mitra (1999) endogenizes lobby formation
1Excerpt from a speech held in Las Vegas, 15 November, 2007.
2Excerpt from a speech held in Minneapolis, 4 September, 2008.
3The introductory chapter of Grossman and Helpman (2001), from which this figure is taken,
contains ample qualitative and quantitative evidence regarding lobbying.
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in the realm of trade policy, using communication-based refinements to arrive at
equilibria with endogenous lobby formation. Felli and Merlo (2006) study endogenous
lobbying, taking the groups capable of engaging in lobbying activities as exogenously
given. Laussel (2006) and Zudenkova (2008) allow lobbies to be endogenously formed.
Yet, just like Mitra (1999), both papers presuppose a high degree of communication
among those agents who could possibly benefit from lobbying. Thus, in these papers
it is implicitly assumed that groups already exist. The question is whether these
become active as lobby groups. However, the question as to why and when these
groups are formed in the first place, is left unanswered. This chapter addresses these
issues.
We present a theory that explains lobby group formation. In our model special
interest groups engaging in lobbying activities, simply called lobbies, have to be built
up from scratch by citizens who oppose the socially optimal policy. Some citizens
prefer a more left-wing policy to the socially optimal policy and some prefer a more
right-wing policy to the socially optimal policy.4 Each citizen can initiate a special
interest group, but it is costly to set up such an organization. A special interest group
subsequently has to raise funds from citizens to finance its lobbying activities. In the
last stage of the game the actual lobbying takes place.5 The policy maker, who has
both welfarist and rent-seeking motives, need not be swayed by a lobby’s efforts. This
source of uncertainty and the fact that a lobby could face competition from another
lobby with opposing interests imply that starting a lobby is a risky endeavour.
Importantly, because citizens cannot communicate with each other during the lobby
formation stage, coordination failures and free-riding might impede the formation
of a, from an individual citizen’s perspective, desirable lobby.
Both the formation of lobbies and the probability that lobbying is successful, i.e.
the probability that the government caters to a lobby’s demands, is endogenous in
our model. Lobby formation, lobby success, and the impact lobbying has on expected
welfare depends on the level of political polarization, the affinity for contributions
of the incumbent policy maker, the cost of getting organized, and the numbers of
agents at each end of the political spectrum. We compare lobbying with another
way to influence political outcomes: trying to get elected as a policy maker. This
comparison sheds light on the question why some opt to lobby rather than participate
in elections.
We model lobbying as a rent-seeking contest (Tullock, 1980, Konrad, 2009). We
4The left-wing/right-wing nomenclature is only used for expositional purposes.
5Lobbies could also have an incentive to gather information and provide it to the policy maker.
See also Grossman and Helpman (2001). We abstract from this possibility and focus on activities
which can directly affect the policy maker’s payoff.
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assume however that with some probability the policy maker ignores the lobbying
efforts and simply implements the socially optimal policy. If the policy maker does
give in to the efforts of a lobby, then the policy advocated by that lobby is im-
plemented. This generalization of the standard contest specification, which is due
to Dasgupta and Nti (1998), allows us to endogenize the design of the contest by
letting the policy maker decide on the rules of the game. If the policy maker only
cares about policy issues, then he completely ignores any lobbying activities. By con-
trast, a policy maker who derives utility from lobbying expenditures - for example,
a corrupt policy maker - optimally trades off expected lobbying expenditures with
social welfare when designing the contest. Only in the latter case does lobbying occur
and need the socially optimal policy not be implemented. Our approach assigns a
more active role to the policy maker than the common agency framework (Douglas
Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) that is predominantly used to study lobbying.6
From the group perspective initiating a special interest group is certainly worth-
wile as long as the benefit of such an action outweighs its cost. However, since
individual citizens cannot coordinate their plans and have an incentive to free-ride
on the efforts borne by others, forming a lobby boils down to a collective action
problem (Olson, 1965). In equilibrium each citizen initiates a lobby with the prob-
ability that balances the expenditures saved by free-riding with the cost of forgoing
the posssibility to lobby the policy maker. The equilibrium of our model is therefore
characterized by a random number of lobbies. Consequently, both excessive, purely
wasteful lobby formation (several lobbies trying to accomplish the same) and a total
lack of lobby formation can occur in equilibrium. Our model thus explains the mul-
titude of special interest groups trying to acccomplish similar policy changes. For
instance, Wikipedia lists ten interest groups advocating the right to own and bear
firearms in the United States and eight interest groups which oppose such rights.7
A citizen who forms a lobby provides a collective good freely enjoyed by all agents
with similar policy preferences. The expected value of this collective good depends
on whether or not a lobby advocating the policy at the other end of the political
spectrum is formed. If both left-wing and right-wing citizens manage to form one
or more lobbies advocating their favourite policy, then in the lobbying stage com-
petition between lobbies with diametrically opposed interests ensues. Competition
increases donations and reduces the likelihood that lobbying is successful. In fact,
6In these common agency games the policy maker is the agent and the lobbies act as the
agent’s principals. Each lobby offers the policy maker a policy-contingent transfer. The policy
maker subsequently implements a policy and receives the associated transfers. There is no strategic
role for the policy maker: the lobbies de facto play a game ‘through’ their common agent.
7http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National Rifle Association, accessed February 13, 2009.
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from an ex ante perspective, a citizen who prefers one of the two extreme poli-
cies faces a prisoner’s dilemma: lobbying is better than refraining from civic action,
yet competing with a lobby advocating the policy at the other end of the political
spectrum is the worst possible outcome.
The observations of the previous paragraph imply that the value of the collective
good is endogenous. Moreover, because funds are supplied by individual agents, the
value of the collective good is reduced by privately incurred costs. These two factors
- the endogenous nature of the collective good, the privately incurred costs - affect
the incentives of individual citizens to initiate a lobby nontrivially. Whether or not
large groups are less successful than small groups in furthering their interests, i.e.
whether or not the Olson paradox (Olson, 1965) holds, depends therefore on the
finer details of the economic environment. Esteban and Ray (2001) also study the
group size paradox in a setting with a collective good with a partly private nature. It
turns out that their result - the probability that a group wins a rent-seeking contest
incrases in the group’s size as long as the private component of the exogenous prize
is sufficiently small - also holds in our setting with an endogenous prize.
Of course, citizens who favour the socially optimal policy could also engage in
lobbying to counter the lobbying activities of citizens with ‘extreme preferences’. In
our basic model such ‘moderate citizens’ are assumed to refrain from lobbying. As a
robustness check, we allow these citizens to also initiate lobbies in a simplified version
of the model.8 In this variant the policy maker is highly susceptible to lobbying
efforts. This implies that it is very likely that the policy maker implements one of
the extreme policies should moderate citizens refrain from lobbying. Yet, even in this
worst case scenario for moderate citizens does lobbying by such citizens seldomly
occur. In fact, if the number of citizens is sufficiently large, then citizens who prefer
the socially optimal policy never initiate lobbies. The reason behind the spare use of
lobbying by moderate citizens is that the potential gains stemming from lobbying are
much smaller than those for citizens with extreme preferences: for instance, a left-
wing citizen experiences much more disutility from implementation of the right-wing
policy than a moderate citizen does.
We compare the outcomes of our lobbying game with the outcomes of a voting
game similar to the citizen-candidates models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and
Besley and Coate (1997). In our voting game each citizen, those with extreme prefer-
ences as well as those who prefer the socially optimal policy, can choose to become a
candidate in an election. Running as a candidate is costly. The winner of the election
8Allowing moderate citizens to initiate lobbies in the full-fledged model renders this model
untractable.
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can implement his most preferred policy. Just like in the lobbying game, the inability
of a citizen to communicate with fellow citizens leads to an equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Since the socially optimal policy is (by definition) favoured by the median
voter, a candidate advocating this policy attracts more votes than a candidate advo-
cating another policy. Consequently, moderate citizens have the strongest incentives
to become candidates. Members of the smallest group with extreme preferences (ei-
ther the left-wing citizens or the right-wing citizens) never become candidates. The
other group of citizens with extreme preferences can sometimes vote for a candidate
who advocates their preferred policy. Yet, such a candidate only wins the election
in the unlikely event that no moderate citizen runs for policy maker. The electoral
route is therefore far less compelling than the lobbying route for citizens with extreme
preferences and relatively few allies, especially if the level of political polarization is
large.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce
the basic model. Section 6.3 contains the analysis of the model, including derivation
of equilibria, comparative statics results, and the aforementioned robustness check.
We extend the model by endogenizing the contest design in Section 6.4. We also
present welfare results in that section. A comparison of the lobbying route with
the electoral route can be found in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 offers some concluding
remarks. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
6.2 The Model
The economy contains three types of agents: left-wing agents (L-agents), moderate
agents (M -agents), and right-wing agents (R-agents). The M -agents have the same
policy preferences as P , the incumbent policy maker. The policy maker’s most pre-
ferred policy is called policy M . The L-agents prefer a more leftist policy (policy
L) being implemented than the one preferred by P , whereas the R-agents prefer
policy R. This policy is to the right of policy M . An i-agent suffers a disutility from
policy x ∈ {L,M,R} being implemented equal to the political distance between i
and x, i = L,M,R. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the political distance
between L and M is equal to the political distance between R and M . This distance
is ∆ > 0. Because the policy issue is unidimensional, the political distance between
L and R is simply 2∆. So, if for instance L is implemented, then an R-agent ex-
periences a disutility of 2∆, whereas an M -agent experiences a disutility of ∆. The
policies L and R, being located at the opposing endpoints of the political spectrum,
are polar policies. The number ∆ can therefore be interpreted as the level of political
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polarization. There are ni > 1 i-agents, i = L,M,R.
Without any intervention by agents in the political process the policy maker will
implement policy M . However, any L-agent or R-agent can start a special interest
group which can lobby the policy maker. Initiating such a lobby comes at a mone-
tary cost f > 0, incurred fully by the agent who decided to initiate a lobby. This
start-up cost includes the costs of forming an organization, expenditures on pub-
lic relations activities, and personnel costs. We suppose that getting organized is a
prerequisite for successful lobbying as it ”reduce[s] transaction costs in lobbying ac-
tivity, coordinate[s] campaign-giving decisions, and communicate[s] political ‘offers’
to the politicians” (Mitra, 1999, p. 1120). Thus, without a full-fledged organization
like-minded agents cannot coordinate their lobbying efforts and, more importantly,
any attempt by an individual agent to influence the political process will be in vain.
Importantly, an agent who has initiated a lobby cannot recoup her start-up cost f
should another agent also have initiated a lobby advocating the same policy.
A lobby tries to raise money from agents. This money is subsequently used to
influence P ’s policy choice. We assume that lobbies can effortlessly convert donations
into lobbying efforts. These efforts are nonrefundable. If a lobby is successful, then
the policy maker implements the lobby’s most preferred policy (either policy L or
policy R) instead of policy M . For the moment we assume that agents who prefer
policy M do not engage in lobbying activities. We return to possible lobbying by
M -agents in Subsection 6.3.4. There we show that these agents have much weaker
incentives to form a lobby than L-agents and R-agents have. It is therefore reasonable
to restrict attention to lobbying by agents with extreme preferences.
We model lobbying as a rent-seeking contest in the following way. The probability
that P implements policy i is
pii(DL, DR) =
Di
DL +DR + β
, i = L,R, (6.1)
where Di is the aggregate amount of donations to lobbies advocating policy i and
β ≥ 0. The probability that P implements policy M equals
piM (DL, DR) =
β
DL +DR + β
. (6.2)
The number β signifies the level of ‘toughness’ of the policy maker: as β increases,
the probability that P sticks to policy M increases. The specification (6.1)-(6.2) is
taken from Dasgupta and Nti (1998). It has two important features.
Firstly, there are no economies or diseconomies of scale. This implies that the
distribution of efforts among lobbies advocating the same policy does not matter.
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So, if for instance two lobbies advocate policy R, then the probability that R is
implemented depends on the sum of the total donations to the two groups. The
linearity of the above specification implies that lobbies do not face coordination
problems (or any other type of frictions) at the lobbying stage or at the donations
stage.9 This contrasts with the first stage of the game, which is plagued by such
collective action problems.
Secondly, if β > 0, then with positive probability neither contestant wins the
‘prize’ of the contest. Dasgupta and Nti (1998) use the specification (6.1)-(6.2) to
allow for the possibility that the organizer of a contest values the contested prize
himself and opts to retain it with positive probability. One of their motivating ex-
amples deals with a policy maker who cares about both welfare and any rents he
might be able to obtain from holding office. In this example the prize is social wel-
fare and β being positive means that the government cares about social welfare. So,
besides the level of toughness one can interpret β as the level of benevolence of the
policy maker P . We discuss the motives of our policy maker in due course. The case
β = 0 coincides with the standard rent-seeking contest in which the organizer of the
contest parts with the prize with certainty.
We mainly interpret an agent as an individual citizen. Yet, an agent could also be
a (small) ‘club’ of citizens acting cooperatively. An example would be the inhabitants
of a neighbourhood. Since we are interested in the formation of lobbies by agents
who are unable to coordinate on a specific action, we take an agent to be the largest
club of citizens such that coordination within a club is possible, but coordination
between clubs is not possible. So, the members of a club do not suffer from the public
good nature of initiating a lobby and can figure out a way to share the burden of
the start-up cost f . Again, overcoming the coordination problems between agents
by getting organized is crucial. Without an organization coordination is impossible.
An agent can donate any amount to any lobby. Of course, an i-agent will only
donate, if she donates at all, to special interest groups lobbying for i. Since the
distribution of donations among lobbies advocating policy i does not matter, we
only have to look at the total donations of an i-agent to the collection of special
interest groups lobbying for i, i = L,R. These collections play an important role in
the analysis and we therefore introduce the following:
Definition 6.1 The collection of interest groups lobbying for i is called coalition i.
We say that coalition i is formed if at least one lobby advocating policy i emerges,
i.e. if coalition i is non-empty, i = L,R.
9This allows us to put these two stages together in one big stage without loss of generality.
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Note that coalition i can contain any number of lobbies between 0 and ni. Coalition
i is not formed only if this number is 0. Note that an i-agent is unable to support
her favourite policy in the second stage if coalition i is not formed.
Each agent attaches a constant marginal utility of λ > 0 to income. Note that a
high λ indicates a low wealth level, i.e. the economy can be considered as poor. A
rich economy is associated with a low λ. We therefore call 1/λ the level of wealth.10
Taking into account the policy choice x, the possibly incurred start-up cost, and any
individual donations d ≥ 0, an L-agent’s utility is:
uL(x, d, δ) =

−λd− δλf if x = L
−∆− λd− δλf if x = M
−2∆− λd− δλf if x = R,
(6.3)
where δ = 0 if the agent under consideration has not initiated a lobby and δ = 1 if
she has initiated a lobby. Likewise, if x is implemented, then an R-agent donating d
has utility:
uR(x, d, δ) =

−λd− δλf if x = R
−∆− λd− δλf if x = M
−2∆− λd− δλf if x = L.
(6.4)
All agents are risk-neutral.
The following game unfolds. In the first stage all agents independently and si-
multaneously decide whether or not to initiate a lobby. In the second stage each
agent can donate to lobbies in coalition L or coalition R provided the coalition of
her liking is formed. As f is sunk at this stage, whether or not an agent has initiated
a lobby does not affect the amount she donates. In the last stage the policy that
is going to be implemented is determined according to (6.1)-(6.2) and payoffs are
realized. At each stage, past actions are observable.
We look for subgame perfect equilibria. A strategy of an agent consists of the
probability with which the agent initiates a lobby in the first stage and the amount
she donates in the second stage. Of course, these donations depend on which coali-
tions are formed in the first stage. The focus will be on symmetric equilibria, i.e.
each L-agent uses the same strategy and each R-agent uses the same strategy. Im-
posing symmetry enables us to select a unique equilibrium. More importantly, it
means that we focus on the only equilibrium of the game that does not presuppose
coordination between agents: it is reasonable to assume that agents can infer that
10It is common practice in the rent-seeking literature to measure expenditures in units commen-
surate with the prize. We do not normalize λ to 1 to be able to emphasize the link between interest
group formation and the level of wealth in the economy.
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other agents with the same preferences and the same abilities will act in a similar
fashion as themselves.11
6.3 Analysis
We introduce the following:
Condition 6.1 The political distance is sufficiently large to warrant civic action.
More specifically, ∆ > βλ.
If this condition fails to hold, then either the policy maker is too tough or the polit-
ical issue at stake is not important enough (relative to income) to make donations
worthwile. As a consequence, no lobbies are initiated if ∆ ≤ βλ. We concentrate on
the more interesting situations in which lobbying can occur.
6.3.1 Equilibrium Donations
We determine each agent’s expected utility gross of any start-up costs in equilibria
of subgames starting in stage two. Four cases need to be considered: neither coalition
is formed, only coalition L is formed, only coalition R is formed, and both coalitions
are formed. Let A be the set of formed coalitions, so A ∈ {∅, {L}, {R}, {L,R}}.
We denote an i-agent’s expected utility gross of start-up costs in the equilibrium of
‘continuation game A’ by vi(A), i = L,R. We call this number an i-agent’s payoff
in A. An i-agent’s equilibrium donation in continuation game A is denoted di(A).
These numbers are derived below.
Neither coalition is formed. The policy maker implementsM after having received
no donations whatsoever. The two types of agents have the same payoff in this
continuation game: vL(∅) = vR(∅) = −∆.
Only L is formed. In this case the policy maker implements either L (with proba-
bility DLDL+β ) or M (with the complementary probability). Let D
−j
L be the aggregate
donations to coalition L excluding the donations of L-agent j. We derive j’s best
response to D−jL . If this agent donates d
j , then her expected (gross) utility equals
−∆ β
(D−jL + dj) + β
− λdj .
Agent j’s first-order condition reads
∆
β(
D−jL + dj + β
)2 = λ.
11The symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium is thus focal.
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Observe that agent j wants to donate up to the point where the marginal gain of
the total donations equal λ. We discuss the implications of this feature of the model






Aggregate equilibrium donations to L are DL({L}) =
(√
βλ∆ − βλ)/λ. It follows
that L is implemented with probability 1 −
√
βλ

















vR({L}) = −2∆ +
√
βλ∆.
Only R is formed. The analysis of this case mirrors the analysis of the previous






















Both L and R are formed. Let DR, the aggregate donations to coalition R, be
given and suppose that the donations to L excluding those of L-agent j sum to D−jL .
If this agent donates dj her expected gross utility reads
−∆ 2DR + β
(D−jL + dj) +DR + β
− λdj .
Similarly, R-agent k donating an amount dk enjoys an expected gross utility of
−∆ 2DL + β
DL + (D−kR + dk) + β
− λdk,
where D−kR is the aggregate donations of other R-agents. The associated first-order
conditions reveal that in equilibrium the following holds:
λ = ∆
2DR + β(
(D−jL + dj) +DR + β
)2 = ∆ 2DL + β(
DL + (D−kR + dk) + β
)2 .
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In equilibrium the two denominators are the same and hence aggregate donations
are DL({L,R}) = DR({L,R}) = 12 (∆/λ− β). Invoking symmetry yields
dL({L,R}) = ∆− βλ2λnL ,
dR({L,R}) = ∆− βλ2λnR .
(6.7)
The associated probability that P implements i is 12 (1−βλ/∆), i = L,R. The policy























From the above findings we distill the following:
Lemma 6.1 Assume Condition 6.1 holds. If coalition i (i = L,R) is formed,
then in the symmetric equilibrium an i-agent donates more if the other coalition
is also formed (di({L,R}) > di({i})), but the probability that i is implemented
is smaller if the other coalition is also formed (Pr(P implements i|{L,R}) <
Pr(P implements i|{i})). An i-agent ranks her payoffs in the various continuation
games as follows:
vL({L}) > vL(∅) > vL({L,R}) > vL({R}),
vR({R}) > vR(∅) > vR({L,R}) > vR({L}).
(6.9)
As has already been noted, an individual agent has an incentive to donate up
to the point where the marginal political gain of the total donations equals λ. This
implies that any distribution of donations among i-agents such that these donations
sum to Di(A) constitutes an equilibrium strategy profile of i-agents in continuation
game A.12 More importantly, it also implies that there is no collective action problem
at this stage: the choices of individual i-agents lead to the same aggregate donations
as the choice of a planner maximizing the collective payoff of all i-agents.
Lemma 6.1 states that a coalition of lobbies receives more donations if the other
coalition is also formed, i.e. competition between lobbies amplifies donations. At
the same time, the probability that the policy maker gives in to the equilibrium
12This observation is also made in Baik (1993). Baik furthermore shows that only the ”hungriest”
agents, i.e. those with the lowest λ or, equivalently, the highest ∆, will expend effort in a rent-
seeking contest with a public-good prize. One easily sees that, ignoring lump-sum transfers between
i-agents, the other equilibria of continuation game A lead to the same outcomes.
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efforts expended by coalition i is smaller if the other coalition is also present. Yet,
the probability that P implements one of the two extremal policies is larger if both
coalitions are formed. These results lead to the ranking (6.9).
6.3.2 Equilibrium Lobby Formation
In a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies an L-agent starts a lobby with some
probability pL and an R-agent with some probability pR. Obviously, existence of such
equilibria depends on the size of the start-up cost f . We now investigate possible
mixed strategy equilibria assuming f is such that a symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies does exist. A sufficient condition ensuring that the game has a unique
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies is presented below.
Let φi be the probability that coalition i is not formed if each individual i-agent
initiates a lobby with probability pi in the first stage of the game, i.e. φi := (1−pi)ni ,
i = L,R. If an i-agent opts for a mixed strategy, then she must be indifferent between
not initiating a lobby and initiating a lobby. The following equality therefore holds








(1−φR)vL({L,R}) = φRvL({L})+(1−φR)vL({L,R})−λf. (6.10)
The left-hand side is an L-agent’s expected utility if she decides to refrain from
initiating a lobby and all other citizens use the mixed strategies specified by (pL, pR).
It consists of her payoffs in the four possible continuation games. These payoffs are
weighted according to the probability with which they occur should every agent
except the L-agent under consideration abide by the above mixed strategies. The
right-hand side is her expected utility if she does initiate a lobby. Of course, besides
the start-up cost, the right-hand side only contains the payoffs in continuation games
in which coalition L is formed. Note that, since the distribution of donations among
lobbies advocating the same policy does not matter, neither side of the equilibrium
condition depends on the number of lobbies advocating a given policy. Interchanging
L and R in the above equilibrium condition leads to the equilibrium condition for
an R-agent.
































∆ ∈ (0, 1) and F := λf∆ . Recall from Lemma 6.1 that βλ∆ is the
equilibrium probability that P implements M if both coalitions are formed, whereas√
βλ
∆ is the equilibrium probability that P implements M if one coalition is formed.
The number ν thus measures the likelihood that lobbying fails. The ratio F is a
simple cost-benefit ratio: it is the loss in utility associated with the cost of initiating
a lobby divided by the gain in utility if the most preferred policy is implemented
instead of policy M . Armed with these interpretations, one sees that the left-hand
sides of (6.11)-(6.12) equal the expected gain from initiating a lobby for an L-agent
and an R-agent respectively, whereas the right-hand sides are equal to the cost of
initiating a lobby. The expected gain from initiating a lobby for, say, anR-agent is the
probability-weighted sum of two terms: the increase in payoff vR({L,R})− vR({L})
and the increase in payoff vR({R})− vR(∅).
We now present the following:
Proposition 6.1 Assume Condition 6.1 holds. If
F < 1− ν − 1− ν
2
2ni
, i = L,R, (6.13)
then the game has a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. In this equilib-
rium an i-agent initiates a lobby with probability p∗i ∈ (0, 1) in the first stage, where
p∗i = 1− (φ∗i )
1
n , i = L,R. The pair (φ∗L, φ
∗
R) is the unique solution to (6.11)-(6.12).
The equilibrium donations in the continuation games {L}, {R}, and {L,R} are given
in (6.5), (6.6), and (6.7).
The above result states that all agents initiate a lobby with positive probability
as long as the cost of such an action (measured in cost per benefit units) is not too
large compared to a measure of the expected gain from lobbying. This measure, i.e.
the right-hand side of (6.13), is proportional to an i-agent’s gain from lobbying if the
opposing group of agents form their coalition with certainty and all other i-agents
refrain from lobbying. To arrive at this measure for, say, i = L one has to substitute
φ∗L = 1 and φ
∗
R = 0 in the left-hand side of (6.11). The condition is reminiscent
of the ”privileged group” condition of Olson (1965) which states (in the present
setting) that the private expected benefit from the prize to one agent exceeds the
cost of initiating a lobby. Proposition 6.1 reveals that even in this privileged group
situation collective action need not ensue.
If F or ν is too large, then agents never initiate lobbies. The first type of agents
who refrain from such actions are those with the smallest number of political allies.
For instance, if nR < nL, then R-agents are more likely to remain inactive in stage
one: in that case condition (6.13) is more stringent for i = R. The reason is that the
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anticipated per agent donation in stage two is very high if the number of political
allies is small as can be gathered from (6.5), (6.6), and (6.7). Note that the game has
a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium for any number of agents nL > 1
and nR > 1 if F < 1− ν − 1−ν24 .
Because initiating a lobby advocating a certain policy beyond the first one ad-
vocating that policy merely entails expending start-up costs (and is thus purely
wasteful), agents do not opt to initiate a lobby with certainty even if F and ν are
both very small. This implies that lobbying for i need not occur in equilibrium (in
fact, such lobbying occurs with probability 1 − φ∗i < 1). Thus, because agents are
unable to coordinate actions in the first stage, they run the risk of not having the
opportunity to lobby with the policy maker in the second stage. This risk does not
vanish as the conditions for lobbying improve (F and/or ν decrease). On the other
hand, miscoordination can also lead to excessive lobby formation.
6.3.3 Comparative Statics
Proposition 6.1 ascertains that precisely one symmetric equilibrium can prevail. This
result allows us to perform comparative statics. Our first comparative statics result
deals with changes in p∗i and φ
∗
i as the parameters ∆, f , λ, and β vary:
Proposition 6.2 Assume Condition 6.1 and the inequalities (6.13) hold. Then the
equilibrium probability p∗i that an i-agent initiates a lobby, i = L,R, increases in
the level of political polarization ∆, decreases in the start-up cost f , increases in the
level of wealth 1/λ, and decreases in the level of toughness of the policy maker β.
The probability that at least one lobby advocating policy i is formed (i.e. 1−φ∗i ),
i = L,R, reacts in the same manner on changes in these parameters.
Proposition 6.2 is intuitive. As the saliency of the political issue at stake relative
to income increases, that is either ∆ or 1/λ increases, undertaking civic action be-
comes more worthwile and hence an agent becomes more inclined to initiate a lobby.
On the other hand, if it becomes less likely that the policy maker can be swayed
by lobbying efforts, i.e. P ’s toughness β increases, agents are more likely to refrain
from forming lobbies. Naturally, an increase in the start-up cost f makes agents
more reluctant to initiate a lobby.
Contrary to the comparative statics with respect to ∆, f , 1/λ, and β, changes
in the number of agents on either side of the political spectrum do not lead to
straightforward changes in the equilibrium strategies. As the next result shows, the
behaviour of the equilibrium strategies as the number of agents varies depends non-
trivially on the values of F and ν.
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Proposition 6.3 Assume Condition 6.1 and the inequalities (6.13) hold. Then there
exist maps Φ : N× [0, 1]→ [0, 1], Ψ : N× [0, 1]→ [0, 1], where Ψ(n, τ) ≤ Φ(n, τ) for
all n ≥ 2, τ ∈ [0, 1], such that the following holds:
• φ∗L increases in nL and φ∗R decreases in nL if F < Ψ(nL, ν),
• φ∗L decreases in nL and φ∗R increases in nL if F > Φ(nL, ν),
• φ∗R increases in nR and φ∗L decreases in nR if F < Ψ(nR, ν),
• φ∗R decreases in nR and φ∗L increases in nR if F > Φ(nR, ν).
Both Φ and Ψ increase in their first argument and decrease in their second argument.
Moreover, for ν < 1 sufficiently large, there exists a non-empty interval I(ν) such
that φ∗i , i = L,R, decreases in ni for ni small but increases in ni for ni large as long
as F ∈ I(ν).
Figure 6.1: If ν = 0.8, then φ∗i is nonmonotonic in ni if F ∈ I(0.8).
Figure 1 illustrates some of the claims of Proposition 6.3. It depicts (F, ni)-space
partitioned into various regions. To the left of the curve labelled Ψ(ni, 0.8), F is
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smaller than Ψ(ni, 0.8) and hence φ∗i is increasing in ni in this region. In the region
to the right of the curve labelled Φ(ni, 0.8), F exceeds Φ(ni, 0.8) and φ∗i is therefore
decreasing in ni. If F ∈ I(0.8), say F = 0.075, then φ∗i is nonmonotonic in ni. To see
this observe that the vertical line F = 0.075 crosses the graph of Φ(·, 0.8) as well as
the graph of Ψ(·, 0.8). This has two implications. Firstly, because 0.075 > Φ(3, 0.8),
φ∗i decreases as ni increases from 2 to 3, i.e. φ
∗
i is decreasing in ni if ni is sufficiently
small. Secondly, at the same time 0.075 < Ψ(∞, 0.8), implying that φ∗i must be
increasing in ni for ni large.
The result that φ∗L and φ
∗
R move in opposite direction as nL or nR changes is
not difficult to understand. If, say, φ∗R increases due to an increase in nR, then the
expected gain in utility of an L-agent from initiating a lobby increases. The reason
is that a special interest group lobbying for policy L has a smaller probability of
facing competition (by a lobby advocating policy R) in the last stage. The prospect
of competing with a lobby advocating policy R (continuation game {L,R}) is par-
ticularly unattractive for an L-agent contemplating initiating a lobby as it combines
large donations with a low probability of getting the favorite policy implemented.
In fact, it is not difficult to see that vL({L,R})− vL({R}) < vL({L})− vL(∅). The
probability that a special interest group lobbying for policy L does not face compe-
tition, which is thus the rosier prospect for our L-agent, increases as φ∗R increases.
These observations imply that φ∗L and φ
∗
R move in opposite direction.
The intuition behind the result that the response of φ∗i to changes in the number
of agents depends crucially on F and ν is more involved. To explain this intuition we
first list the three effects that affect an agent’s incentives in the first stage. Firstly,
an agent’s incentive to initiate a lobby depends on the expected gain of such an
action should no other agent with the same political stance initiate a lobby. We
call this the gain effect. As can be gathered from (6.11)-(6.12), the expected gain
equals
(





in case i = L. (The expectation with respect
to the contest probabilities is taken.) Because total donations are borne by more
agents as nL grows, the expected gain increases in nL. Secondly, the usefulness of
initiating a lobby depends on whether or not other agents also initiate lobbies: if
one particular i-agent initiates a lobby, then other i-agents prefer to free-ride on this
particular agent’s action rather than initiate their own lobby. This free-riding effect
is the term φ
1− 1ni
i in (6.11)-(6.12). Lastly, an agent becomes less inclined to initiate
a lobby if F increases. This is the cost effect.
Let us now consider the impact F has on changes in φ∗L as nL changes. We
know from Proposition 6.2 that φ∗L and φ
∗
R are relatively small if F is small. This
has two implications. Firstly, the change in the gain effect for an L-agent as nL is
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replaced by nL + 1 is small if φ∗R is small. Secondly, a small φ
∗
L means that p
∗
L is
relatively large. As a consequence, the probability that a lobby advocating policy L
is formed increases quite a bit as the number of L-agents increases by 1 should p∗L
remain constant. But, if initiating a lobby becomes only marginally more attractive
(the first implication), agents have an incentive to exploit the large change in the
free-riding effect (the second implication) and thus reduce the probability with which
they initiate a lobby. Hence a higher φ∗L prevails. By contrast, if F is relatively large,
then the change in the free-riding effect is small and does not outweigh the (large)
gain effect. As a consequence, φ∗L decreases in nL.
To understand how ν affects changes in φ∗L as nL increases, we use insights pro-
vided by Esteban and Ray (2001). Esteban and Ray (2001) investigate the collective
action problem when the prize a group can obtain by participating in a rent-seeking
contest can have both a private component and a public component. The private
component of the prize has to be divided between the members of the winning
group. The benefit of the private component to an individual member of a group
thus diminishes as the group size increases. By contrast, the benefit of the public
component to a group member does not depend on the group size. They show that
the equilibrium probability that a specific group wins the rent-seeking contest in-
creases in this group’s size if the public component is sufficiently large relative to
the total size of the prize.
In the present setting, the agents face a collective action problem in the first
stage of the game similar in spirit to the one Esteban and Ray (2001) consider. If
an agent initiates a lobby with a higher probability, i.e. exerts more individual effort
(in expected terms), then the probability that the prize is obtained in the second
stage increases.13 The probabilities pL and pR can thus be seen as individual efforts
exerted in the ‘contest’ taking place in the first stage. Moreover, the prize of this
‘contest’ (the gain effect) has a private component and a public component. The




R, the public component is
1− ν. The relative size of the public component equals
1
1− 12 (1− φ∗R)− ν2 (1 + φ∗R)
.
This number increases in ν. Consequently, a large ν means a relative important public
component and therefore, invoking Esteban and Ray’s intuition, the probability that
the L-agents win, i.e. 1−φ∗L, increases in nL. This means that φ∗L decreases in nL if
ν is large. This conclusion is in line with the second bullet point of Proposition 6.3.
13Esteban and Ray (2001) allow the cost of effort to be nonlinear. In our setting this (expected)
cost is linear and equals piλf , i = L,R.
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The first bullet point informs us that the probability that the L-agents win decreases
in nL if the public component is relatively small.
Esteban and Ray’s results are intuitive in our setting: if the private component
is relatively important, then the gain diminishes rapidly when the number of L-
agents increases. The incentive to initiate a lobby then also diminishes rapidly and a
higher φ∗L prevails. Conversely, if the public component is relatively important, the
decrease in the incentive to initiate a lobby is more than offset by the increase in the
number of agents who initiate a lobby with positive probability and hence a lower
φ∗L prevails.
6.3.4 Agents with Moderate Preferences
In this section we perform a robustness check. It could be that agents who have
moderate preferences, i.e. the M -agents, have an incentive to counter the lobbying
activities of agents with extreme preferences by also becoming involved in lobbying.
To investigate this possibility we look at a situation in which L-agents, R-agents, as
well as M -agents can initiate special interest groups which can lobby with the policy
maker. We assume that the policy maker retains the prize with zero probability, i.e.
β = 0. The policy maker implements policy M if no lobbying occurs. We thus focus
on the standard contest success function as used in Tullock (1980). Observe that
this situation is a worst case scenario for M -agents: if they refrain from civic action,
then the policy maker P will not implement their favorite policy as soon as at least
one of the extreme collections is formed. If β were positive, then P would implement
policy M with positive probability for any configuration of formed collections. The
case β = 0 thus brings about the largest incentive for an M -agent to initiate a lobby.
The nM M -agents experience a disutility of ∆ if either policy L or policy R
is implemented and experience no disutility if policy M is implemented. Moreover,
these agents have the same wealth level (1/λ) as L-agents and R-agents have. Just
like L-agents and R-agents, an M -agent incurs a start-up cost of f if she initiates a
lobby. If a lobby advocating policy M emerges, we say that coalition M is formed.
Again, the distribution of resources among lobbies advocating the same policy does
not matter. We maintain the timing of the basic model and look for symmetric
subgame perfect equilibria (in mixed strategies).
A detailed analysis of the various continuation games is relegated to the ap-
pendix. The payoffs of an agent of type i ∈ {L,M,R} in each continuation game
A ∈ {∅, {L}, {M}, {R}, {L,M}, {L,R}, {M,R}, {L,M,R}} (denoted vi(A)) are
gathered in Table 1. This table reveals that M -agents, just like L-agents and R-
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Table 6.1: Payoffs in the various continuation games of the game with M -agents.
vL(·) vM (·) vR(·)
∅ −∆ 0 −∆
{L} 0 −∆ −2∆
{M} −∆ 0 −∆
{R} −2∆ −∆ 0
{L,M} −∆2 − ∆4λnL −∆2 − ∆4λnM − 32∆
{L,R} −∆− ∆2λnL −∆ −∆− ∆2λnR
{M,R} − 32∆ −∆2 − ∆4λnM −∆2 − ∆4λnR
{L,M,R} −∆− ∆2λnL −∆ −∆− ∆2λnR
agents, face a prisoner’s dilemma. However, M -agents suffer less from this dilemma
than L-agents and R-agents do. The reason is that the political distance between
M -agents and the other agents is always ∆, implying that M -agents experience a
policy disutility of at most ∆. The political distance between L-agents and R-agents
is 2∆, implying that the policy disutility of agents with extreme preferences can be
twice as large. This difference in possible disutility brings about a lower marginal
gain from donating to a lobby favouring M for M -agents compared to the marginal
gain from donating to a lobby of their liking for L-agents and R-agents should all
three coalitions be formed. In fact, M -agents refrain from donating to coalition M
altogether if both rival coalitions are formed (continuation game {L,M,R}). More-
over, M -agents are less keen than L-agents and R-agents to engage in civic action
in the first stage of the game. Using techniques similar to those used in Subsection
6.3.2 allows us to formalize this observation:




, then M -agents never initiate lobbies. Conse-
quently, the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of Proposition 6.1 prevails
provided Condition 6.1 and the inequalities (6.13) hold. Moreover, if the number of
i-agents (ni) is sufficiently large, i = L,M,R, then M -agents never initiate lobbies,
irrespective of the value of F .
So, even in the worst case scenario β = 0 the conditions for coalition M to
be formed with positive probability are much more stringent than the conditions
for coalition L or coalition R to be formed with positive probability. In fact, even
if F is relatively small does a sufficient condition a` la the inequalities (6.13) not
obtain. Furthermore, if the economy is very populated (nL, nM , nR large), then M -
agents never initiate lobbies no matter how small the start-up cost. We think that
Proposition 6.4 provides ample reasons to restrict attention to situations in which
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only agents with extreme preferences can get organized.
6.4 Rent-seeking Motives and Welfare
In this section we endogenize the policy maker’s level of toughness β. Recall that it
was argued that β is linked to P ’s benevolence. We establish this link by approx-
imating agents’ behaviour by their limiting behaviour as the number of agents at
both sides of the political spectrum goes to infinity. Restricting attention to such
large populations is reasonable: the vast majority of countries in the world have large
numbers of inhabitants who strongly object their government’s policy plans. We once
again assume that M -agents remain inactive. The following lemma characterizes the
limiting behaviour of the equilibrium probabilities φ∗L and φ
∗
R:
Lemma 6.2 Assume Condition 6.1 and the inequalities (6.13) hold. Then φ∗L →
F
1−ν as nL →∞ (for fixed nR) and φ∗R → F1−ν as nR →∞ (for fixed nL).
This lemma follows directly from the equilibrium conditions (6.11)-(6.12). From
(6.13) we know that this number is strictly between zero and one. So, even with
infinitely many allies does an agent run the risk of not being able to lobby the
policy maker in the second stage. Intuitively, if the number of agents is very large,
then the individual donations become negligible. An individual agent’s expected loss
associated with her not initiating a lobby therefore converges to φ(1 − ν)∆. Since
in equilibrium the probability that coalition i is not formed equates an individual
agent’s cost of initiating a lobby (λf) with the aforementioned loss, φ∗ must converge
to F1−ν .
We now look at an extension of the game analyzed in the previous section. In
this extended game the policy maker sets β in a stage preceding the stage in which
lobbies can be formed. In other words, the policy maker designs the contest. We
assume that the policy maker is able to commit himself to the chosen design in the
last stage of the game. For reasons of analytical tractability we confine attention to
settings with a large number of agents at both ends of the political spectrum (the
setting with a large population), allowing us to use the limiting behaviour presented
in Lemma 6.2.
In the extended game the policy maker P cares about social welfare and about the
efforts expended by lobbies in the rent-seeking contest. Let α ≥ 0 be the weight the
policy maker attaches to lobbies’ efforts relative to total social welfare.14 If α = 0,
then the policy maker is purely benevolent and does not care about the lobbies’
14Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Prat (2002) propose models which link the size of (cam-
paign) funds of a political party/politician to the probability that that political party/politician
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efforts at all. A positive α indicates that P can, to some extent, be influenced by
these efforts. If these efforts constitute illegal monetary transfers from the lobbies to
P , then one can interpret α as P ’s level of corruptibility. For the sake of brevity we
restrict attention to this interpretation. Needless to say, the model applies equally
well to situations in which the efforts of lobbies embody perfectly legal perks.
Whether policy M is the socially optimal policy depends on the number of agents
at each point of the political spectrum. Denote the fraction of the population who
prefer policy i to policy M by µi, so µi := ninL+nM+nR , i = L,R. Then, after nor-
malizing the total size of the population to 1, total social welfare amounts to SM :=
−(µL+µR)∆ ifM is implemented, SL := −(1−µL−µR)∆−2µR∆ = −(1−µL+µR)∆
if L is implemented, and SR := −(1 + µL − µR)∆ if R is implemented. Comparing
these expressions reveals that policy M is the social optimum if and only if the
following holds:




We return to the policy maker’s motives. The payoff of P in continuation game
A ∈ {∅, {L}, {R}, {L,R}}, W (A), reads:







Pr(P implements j|A)× Sj . (6.14)
If the number of agents at each end of the political spectrum is large, then the
probability that continuation game A occurs can be approximated by the limiting
probabilities given in Lemma 6.2. The associated expected utility of the policy maker,
W, is:
W = ( F1−ν )2w(∅)+ F1−ν (1− F1−ν )w({L})+ F1−ν (1− F1−ν )w({R})+(1− F1−ν )2w({L,R}).
(6.15)
Some tedious algebra, which can be found in the appendix, simplifies the above
expression to:
W = ∆(1− ν − F )((1 + ν − F )z − 2F )−∆µ(ν + F )2, (6.16)
where z := α−λλ and µ := µL + µR. The parameter z indicates how much the policy
maker values money more or less than agents do. In particular, because α = (1+z)λ,
a positive z means that P values money more than agents do, whereas a negative z
wins the next election. These models provide a rationale for a positive α, even if the policy maker
cannot wield the funds for private use.
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means P is less interested in money than agents are. The parameter µ is the fraction
of the population who opposes policy M or, more briefly, the fraction of opposers.
The expected utility of the policy maker depends on β only via ν. Differentiating
W with respect to ν thus gives P ’s first order condition from which one deduces the
following:
Proposition 6.5 Suppose Condition 6.2 holds. If z > −µ and F < µ+z1+z , then in














This equilibrium level of toughness β∗ decreases in the level of political polarization
∆, increases in the start-up cost f , decreases in the level of wealth 1/λ, decreases in
the fraction of opposers µ, and decreases in P ’s level of corruptibility α.
If either F ≥ µ+z1+z or z ≤ −µ, then P sets β so large that both L-agents and
R-agents refrain from initiating lobbies.
When designing the contest the policy maker faces a trade-off between higher
expected aggregate donations and lower social welfare: a higher β, and hence a
higher ν, leads to lower expected aggregate donations,15 but at the same time to a
higher probability that P implements the welfare maximizing policy. Observe that
the policy maker, by choosing a level of toughness β, not only designs the contest, but
also chooses the probability with which the contest takes place in the second stage.
In other words, Proposition 6.5 provides an endogenous probability that lobbying
takes place. The optimally designed contest responds to changes in the parameters
in an intricate manner as is explained below.
An increase in the level of political polarization ∆ increases the expected political
gain from donating in the second stage. As a result, aggregate donations (in the
continuation games with formed collections) go up as ∆ increases. To fully benefit
from these larger donations, P increases the likelihood that the contest ensues by
reducing β. Note that there is also a downside to decreasing β in response to an
increase in ∆: the loss in social welfare from implementing either extreme policy
instead of policy M (the socially optimal policy) is aggravated.16 This effect is,
15Expected aggregate donations equal ∆
λ
`
(1− F )2 − ν2´, so the donations component of W is
(1 + z)∆
`
(1− F )2 − ν2´.




, i = L,R.
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however, more than offset by the first effect. Similar effects play a role if the level of
wealth 1/λ increases.
The total donations a coalition receives from agents do not depend on the start-
up cost f . However, because the probability that a coalition lobbies the policy maker
decreases in f , the ex ante expected aggregate donations decrease in f . The (mon-
etary) gains for the policy maker associated with a specific level of toughness thus
decrease in f , whereas the (welfare) cost of the same β does not decrease in f . A
higher β∗ thus prevails.
We use the observation that the policy maker influences the probability that the
contest takes place by choosing β to explain the fourth comparative statics result.
As µ increases the social welfare associated with policy M (SM ) decreases. At the
same time the expected social welfare associated with implementing either extreme




2SR) does not change as µ increases. Consequently,
the welfare cost of having the contest decreases in µ. This gives the policy maker
an incentive to increase the probability that the contest takes place. As a result β∗
decreases in µ.
The last claims of Proposition 6.5 are intuitive. An increase in the level of cor-
ruptibility α boosts the policy maker’s incentives to accrue donations and hence a
lower β prevails. Clearly, if getting organized is very costly (F ≥ µ+z1+z ) or if the policy
maker does not care much about money (z ≤ −µ), P sets β such that agents do not
find it worthwile to initiate lobbies (Condition 6.1 is violated). In other words, the
policy maker does not organize the contest de facto.
Obviously, policy makers are in general not in a position to communicate β∗ and
hence their level of corruptibility to the public.17 Yet, one could argue that agents
can infer something about this number from the average level of corruption they
witness in the economy they inhabit. If the policy maker’s level of corruptibility α
is close to this average level, then the agents can obtain an accurate guess of β∗.
Moreover, agents can also have learnt β∗ via past lobbying activities involving the
current policy maker.
Proposition 6.5 allows us to assess the impact of lobbying on welfare. Because
aggregate donations do not depend on the number of agents and hence donations are
negligible when the number of agents is large, we can ignore these expenditures and
use total expected social welfare, denoted S, as our welfare measure. One obtains:
Proposition 6.6 Suppose Condition 6.2 holds and that z > −µ and F < µ+z1+z .
Then in the equilibrium of the extended game with a large population total expected
17The quotes mentioned in the introduction suggest that the two major candidates in the 2008
U.S. presidential election both have a high β∗.
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social welfare equals
S∗ = −∆ + ∆(1− µ)




Expected social welfare S∗ decreases in the level of political polarization ∆, increases
in the start-up cost f , decreases in the level of wealth 1/λ, and decreases in P ’s level
of corruptibility α.18
Since the above comparative statics results are immediate consequences of those
presented in Proposition 6.5 combined with the fact that social welfare increases
in the level of toughness, we only briefly discuss the intuition behind the results
pertaining to the most interesting parameter, namely α.
Proposition 6.6 establishes an intuitive result: corruptible policy makers are bad
for social welfare. As α increases, i.e. the policy maker becomes more corruptible,
the policy maker’s incentive to attract the lobbies’ funds grows stronger. To lure
agents into lobbying activities the policy maker chooses a low β, thereby indicating
that it is quite likely that he will be swayed by future lobbying activities. This
in turn does make civic action more probable, leading to a lower probability that
the socially optimal policy (policy M) is implemented. Thus, the lower the policy
maker’s benevolence, the lower (expected) welfare will be.
6.5 Elections
In this section we investigate the possibility that agents with an extreme policy
preference do not use lobbying to get their most preferred policy implemented, but
instead try to influence the political process more directly. More specifically, we look
at an election game in the spirit of the citizen-candidates model of Osborne and
Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). In this game each agent (i.e. each
citizen) can opt to become a candidate in an election. The winner of the election
becomes the next policy maker. The policy maker can implement the policy of his
liking. Citizens have no office-holding motive.19
In the first stage of the game all citizens decide simultaneously whether or not
to run for this office. After the set of candidates has become common knowledge,
each candidate shakes hands and kisses babies. During this campaigning each can-
didate’s true most preferred policy is revealed. Since we assume that candidates
18Since a change in µ would entail a change in the preferences of some agents, the comparative
statics result with respect to µ is meaningless and therefore omitted. We are aware of the confusion
the result with respect to 1/λ might cause. It should be clear that S only measures welfare partially.
19This contrasts with the model discussed in the previous sections in which the office holder was
able to extract rents from the lobbies.
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cannot commit to a specific policy,20 citizens take a candidate’s most preferred pol-
icy as the policy which is going to be implemented should this candidate win the
election. Candidates incur a campaign cost of c > 0. The marginal utility of income
is still λ. In the second stage all citizens (including candidates) cast their vote. Vot-
ing is strategic: a citizen maximizes her expected utility when casting her vote.21 If
a citizen is indifferent between several candidates, then she votes for each of those
candidates with equal probability. The candidate who receives the largest number of
votes wins the election, i.e. the winner is determined according to the plurality rule.
In the last stage the winner implements his most preferred policy and payoffs are
realized. If nobody decides to run for office each policy i ∈ {L,M,R} is implemented
with probability 13 .
To make the comparison of the results of this model with the results of our
lobbying model fair, we assume that two or more candidates with the same most
preferred policy, say policy M , are able to select one of them to be the candidate
advocating policy M . In other words, citizens can vote for at most one candidate
advocating policy i, i = L,M,R. However, because candidates need campaigning
to signal their political stance, all citizens who decided to run for office in the first
stage do incur the campaign cost c.
We look for symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of the game. Obviously, no
symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies exist. Let qi be the prob-
ability that an i-agent chooses to become a candidate and let ψi := (1 − qi)ni be
the probability that no candidate favours policy i, i = L,M,R. We assume that
Condition 6.2 holds. It is not difficult to see that this condition implies that the
median voter prefers policy M and hence that a candidate who favours this policy
(an M -candidate) wins any election in which such a candidate participates.
Suppose that nR < nL, implying that an L-candidate obtains more votes than an
R-candidate. If all agents opt to become a candidate with positive probability, then
the equilibrium conditions regarding ψL, ψM , and ψR of the voting game (derivations
can be found in the appendix) are:
ψ
1− 1nL
L ψM (2− ψR) = C, ψ
1− 1nM
M (1− 13ψLψR) = C, ψ
1− 1nR
R ψMψL = C, (6.20)
where C := λc∆ (the equilibrium conditions if nL < nR mirror the above conditions).
The number C is the cost-benefit ratio of the election game. Unfortunately, a suf-
ficient condition akin to the inequalities (6.13) for an equilibrium in purely mixed
20This is common practice in the literature on citizen-candidates.
21The conclusions are not altered if voting is sincere (agents vote for the candidate whose favorite
policy is closest to their own favorite policy) as long as nM > max{nL, nR}.
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strategies to arise cannot be obtained from the conditions (6.20). We can, however,
deduce the equilibrium of the election game for an economy with a large population,
i.e. ni →∞, i = L,M,R:
Proposition 6.7 Suppose Condition 6.2 holds and C < 1. Then the election game
with a large population has a unique (symmetric) equilibrium with the following
probabilities that no i-candidate participates in the election, i = L,M,R:
• If µR < µL and C ≤ 34 , then (ψ∗L, ψ∗M , ψ∗R) = (34 , 43C, 1),
• If µR < µL and C > 34 , then (ψ∗L, ψ∗M , ψ∗R) = (C, 1, 1),
• If µR > µL and C ≤ 34 , then (ψ∗L, ψ∗M , ψ∗R) = (1, 43C, 34 ),
• If µR > µL and C > 34 , then (ψ∗L, ψ∗M , ψ∗R) = (1, 1, C).
Thus, the extreme policy with the smallest number of supporters is never advocated
by a citizen-candidate.
Proposition 6.7 reveals that agents who have the smallest number of political
allies never become candidates. The reason is that these agents would surely lose
the election from any candidate with other preferences. They thus only gain from
being a candidate if the other two policies are not represented by candidates. The
expected gain from becoming a candidate is consequently small, in fact too small
to make becoming a candidate worthwile. These agents therefore only influence the
policy outcome by engaging in lobbying activities. Moreover, if C is small, then
it is ex ante improbable that a candidate who advocates an extreme policy wins
the election. In particular, if C ≤ 34 and µR < µL, then R-agents never become a
candidate, the ex ante probability that an L-candidate wins equals 13C, and the ex
ante probability that an M -candidate wins equals 1 − 43C.22 These numbers imply
that an M -candidate wins the election (and hence policy M is implemented) with
probability close to one if C is very small. Consequently, even if policy L has a large
number of supporters (and more than policy R), then the lobbying route has a much
larger associated probability that L will be implemented than the electoral route if
C is small. Observe that C decreases in the level of political polarization ∆. This
means that the electoral route is in particular a bad option for agents with extreme
preferences if the level of political polarization is large. This contrasts the results
obtained for the extended lobbying game: one can show that the ex ante equilibrium
probability that policy L is implemented increases in ∆.23
22These probabilities do not add to one, because with positive probability nobody becomes a
candidate.




. Consequently, the derivative of
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6.6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a theory that explains the formation of special interest groups
that lobby policy makers. In our model, citizens who oppose the policy maker’s plan
to implement the socially optimal policy can initiate a special interest group. In
contrast with the existing literature a citizen who contemplates initiating a lobby
has to start from scratch, without the means to coordinate actions with fellow citi-
zens. Coordination failures together with citizens’ incentives to free-ride on the civic
actions undertaken by others lead to an equilibrium characterized by a random num-
ber of lobbies. The probability that a certain policy alternative is advocated by a
lobby depends on the level of political polarization, the cost of organizing a special
interest group, the number of citizens at each position in the political spectrum, and
the policy maker’s affinity for the lobbies’ efforts. Our model affirms the common
wisdom that citizens who strongly object to the policy maker’s proposals are most
inclined to initiate lobbies. More surprisingly, the probability that a certain policy
is advocated by a lobby need not be monotonic in the number of citizens who prefer
that policy. The fact that a citizen who initiates a lobby supplies a collective good
(to fellow citizens with the same political stance) with an endogenous value and a
partly private nature drives the comparative statics results regarding the probability
that a lobby advocating a certain policy is formed.
We have argued that lobbying offers a citizen with extreme policy preferences
and few political allies a relatively good shot at having her preferred policy imple-
mented. Comparing the outcomes of our lobbying model with the outcomes of a
citizen-candidates model of electoral competition featuring the same agents reveals
that citizens with extreme preferences only have electoral success in the unlikely
event that no citizen with the median voter’s preferences becomes a candidate in
the election. The electoral route is especially unattractive for citizens with extreme
preferences if the level of political polarization is large.
It goes without saying that our analysis has its limitations. Only three policy
alternatives are feasible in the model. It has therefore only limited applicability in
case the policy maker has a continuum of policies at his disposal, for instance if
he has to set a tax or subsidy. It would be interesting to extend the model to a
this probability with respect to ∆ is 2φ∗L
∂(1−φ∗L)
∂∆





(µ+ z)− (1− µ)F ´2 × ∂F∂∆ .
Because ∂F
∂∆
< 0, we conclude that the probability that policy L is implemented indeed increases
in ∆.
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continuum of policies, perhaps by using the common agency framework that has
already earned its place in the literature on lobbying.
Chapter 6 145
6.A Appendix
Throughout the appendix we use ¬i to signify the polar policy of i. So, if i = R,
then ¬i = L and vice versa. We abbreviate special interest group/lobby to SIG.
Omitted details regarding Lemma 6.1
By Condition 6.1 there exists a ν ∈ (0, 1) such that βλ = ν2∆. We use ν to rewrite
di({L,R})− di({i}):










(ν2 − 2ν + 1).
The expression between brackets is obviously positive. We next compare the proba-
bilities that P implements i in the two relevant continuation games:













ν2 − 2ν + 1) < 0.
The number ν also helps ranking the payoffs vi(A):




























= ∆(1− ν)1 + ν
2ni
> 0,

















Derivation of equations (6.11)-(6.12)
Using the fact that (1 − pi)ni−1 = φ
1− 1ni












i (1− φ¬i)vi({¬i}) = λf.

















from which (6.11)-(6.12) follow immediately.
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Proof of Proposition 6.1
Let nL, nR > 1 be given. Abbreviate (φL, φR) to φ and likewise (nL, nR) to n. We
have to show that, given the restriction (6.13) on F , the system












1− ν = 0, i = L,R (6.21)
has a unique solution φ∗ = φ∗(n). Observe that the LHS of each equation increases
monotonically from 0 to 1− 1+ν2ni + 1−ν2ni φ¬i as φi increases from 0 to 1. Consequently,
for each φ¬i ∈ [0, 1] there is a unique φ˜i = φ˜i(φ¬i) ∈ [0, 1] solving Xi(φi, φ¬i) = 0 if
F
1−ν ≤ 1− 1+ν2ni . Thus, both XL(φL, φR) = 0 and XR(φL, φR) = 0 separately have a
root (φ˜L(φR) respectively φ˜R(φL)) in [0, 1] if (6.13) holds. So, if (6.13) holds, then
the map τ = (τL, τR) : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2, (φL, φR) 7→ (φ˜L, φ˜R) is well-defined. By
the contraction mapping principle, (6.21) has a unique solution φ∗ if there exists an
η ∈ (0, 1) such that
‖τ(φ2)− τ(φ1)‖22 ≤ η‖φ2 − φ1‖22,










Let ai := 1− 1+ν2ni and bi := 1−ν2ni . Observe that, by (6.13), F1−ν < ai. Assume without















It follows from the mean value theorem that |τi(φ2)− τi(φ1)| < |φ2¬i−φ1¬i| for some
 ∈ (0, 1) if the derivative of the function






is strictly positive on [0, 1]. To see this, note that for φ1, φ2 ∈ [0, 1]2, φ1¬i < φ2¬i, one
has
































ni−1+1 = 1− bi
ai
ni
ni − 1 = 1−
ni(1− ν)
(ni − 1)(2ni − 1− ν) .





= 2(1−ν)3−ν < 1





(n− 1)(2n− 1− ν) =
(n2 − 1)(2n− 1− ν)
n2(2n+ 1− ν) < 1, n ≥ 2.
We conclude that
‖τ(φ2)− τ(φ1)‖22 = |τL(φ2)− τL(φ1)|2 + |τR(φ2)− τR(φ1)|2 <
η|φ2R − φ1R|2 + η|φ2L − φ1L|2 = η‖φ2 − φ1‖22,
where η = max{1 − g′L(0), 1 − g′R(0)} ∈ (0, 1) and hence that (6.21) has a unique
solution φ∗ = (φ∗L, φ
∗
R).
Proof of Proposition 6.2
To assess the sign of the four partial derivatives mentioned in the proposition, we
need the sign of ∂φ
∗
i
∂ν and the sign of
∂φ∗i
∂F .
We start with ∂φ
∗
i
∂ν , focusing on i = L. The case i = R can be tackled in a similar































































where all partial derivatives must be evaluated in φ = φ∗. We calculate the value of




































1− 1ni × 1− ν
2ni
, i = L,R, (6.25)










× (1 + φ∗R)−
F
(1− ν)2 . (6.26)

































1− 1+ν2ni + 1−ν2ni φ∗¬i
)−1





































We now determine the sign of the numerator of (6.23). Substituting (6.24)-(6.26)





















































where we have used the fact that (φ∗i )






2(ni − 1) + (1− ν)(1 + φ∗¬i)
.


















2(nL − 1) + (1− ν)(1 + φ∗R)
×
( (1 + φ∗R)(nR − 1)
nRφ∗R
− (1− ν)(1 + φ
∗
L)




















(1− ν)(1 + φ∗L)









we can conclude that the term between square brackets is positive, implying that




We turn our attention to ∂φ
∗
i
∂F , focusing on
∂φ∗L














































− ΓL × 1− ν2nL
)
,
where we have used the fact that (φ∗L)










2(nL − 1) + 1− ν > 0.
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The last claim of Proposition 6.2 is an obvious corollary to the former claims.
Proof of Proposition 6.3
Assume for the moment that nL and nR are continuous variables. A standard
argument shows that all results derived below also hold for nL and nR discrete.








































where all partial derivatives must be evaluated in φ = φ∗. We calculate the value of























































where the second equality follows from the fact that XL(φ∗, n) = 0. Obviously,
∂XR
∂nL































































nL − 1 − ΓL
)
,
where the second and third expression follow from the fact that XL(φ∗, n) = 0. We









nL−1 −ΓL. Recall that ΓL =
(
1− 1+ν2nL + 1−ν2nL φ∗R
)−1










Since HL decreases in ΓL, these inequalities imply that
1−
(


























nL − 1 .












nL−1 < 0, then a forteriori HL(nL) < 0.
One straightforwardly verifies that the first inequality holds if and only if











)−1)] =: (1− ν)Φ˜(nL, ν).











































It follows that φ∗L decreases in nL as long as nL ≤ n¯ if F > (1 − ν)Φ˜(n¯, ν) for
some n¯ > 2. At the same time F should abide by (6.13). We now show that both
conditions can hold simultaneously. Since Φ˜ increases in nL, it suffices to show that
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Φ˜(nL, ν) < 1 − 1+ν4 , i.e. Φ˜(nL, ν) smaller than (6.13) evaluated in nL = 2, as long
as nL ≤ n¯ for some n¯ ≥ 3. Observe that:










This inequality obviously holds for ν < 1 sufficiently large, proving that both con-
ditions hold simultaneously for ν sufficiently large.
The above argument implies that φ∗L is everywhere decreasing in nL (i.e. n¯ =∞)
if F > (1−ν) limnL→∞ Φ(nL, ν) = (1−ν) exp[−ν]. This condition is compatible with
(6.13) if exp[−ν] < 3−ν4 , an inequality which is clearly satisfied for ν < 1 sufficiently
close to 1.
Secondly, HL(nL) > 0 if
1−
(











nL − 1 > 0.
Solving this inequality for F yields:
F < (1− ν)×
(







1− (1− 1 + ν
2nL
)−1)] =: (1− ν)Ψ˜(nL, ν).














)−1−1) exp [(nL−1)(1−(1−1 + ν2nL )−1
)]
> 0.
Thus, φ∗L increases in nL as long as nL ≥ n¯ if F < (1− ν)Ψ˜(n¯, ν) for some n¯ > 2. If
F < (1−ν)Ψ˜(2, ν), i.e. if F < (1−ν) 3−ν4 exp
[− 1+ν3−ν ], then φ∗L is even monotonically
increasing in nL.
Combining the above results, one sees that φ∗L is monotonically increasing in
nL if F < (1 − ν)Ψ˜(2, ν), whereas φ∗L is monotonically decreasing in nL if F >
(1 − ν) limn→∞ Φ˜(n, ν). (The fact that 1+ν3−ν > ν for every ν ∈ (0, 1) implies that
Ψ˜(2, ν) < limn→∞ Φ˜(n, ν). So, the two parameter regions are disjoint.) For F ∈
((1− ν)Ψ˜(2, ν), (1− ν) limn→∞ Φ˜(n, ν)) φ∗L need not be monotonic. Indeed, one can
choose ν < 1 sufficiently large such that Φ˜(3, ν) < limn→∞ Ψ˜(n, ν) for ν < 1. Then
for F ∈ (Φ˜(3, ν), limn→∞ Ψ˜(n, ν)) =: I(ν) φ∗L decreases in nL for nL small and
increases in nL for nL large. See also Figure 1.









































The sign of this expression is minus the sign of (6.31). This implies that φ∗R increases
in nL iff φ∗L decreases in nL.
One readily verifies that Ψ˜(n, ·) ≤ Φ˜(n, ·), n ≥ 2. It is now immedi-
ate that the claims of Proposition 6.3 dealing with changes in nL hold for
Ψ : (n, ν) 7→ (1 − ν)Ψ˜(n, ν) and Φ : (n, ν) 7→ (1 − ν)Φ˜(n, ν). (One readily verifies
that Ψ and Φ decrease in their second argument.) The proofs of the claims regarding
changes in nR mirror the above proofs.
Omitted details regarding Table 1
The payoffs of the continuation games with zero or one group are immediate.
The payoffs of the continuation game {L,R} follow from setting β = 0 in (6.8).
Consider continuation game {L,M}. The expected utility (gross of any start-up
costs) of an M -agent donating dM is − DLDL+DM ∆ − λdM , where Di denotes
the aggregate donations to coalition i, i = L,M,R. The expected utility of
an L-agent donating dL equals − DMDL+DM ∆ − λdL. The FOCs inform us that
DM ({L,M}) = DL({L,M}) = ∆4λ . Imposing symmetry and using the fact that
coalition i obtains the prize with probability 12 in equilibrium yields the payoffs.
The payoffs of continuation game {M,R} can be derived in a similar manner.
The last continuation game we have to investigate is {L,M,R}. In this continu-
ation game the expected utility of an L-agent donating dL is − DM+2DRDL+DM+DR∆−λdL,
that of an M -agent donating dM is − DL+DRDL+DM+DR∆− λdM , and that of an R-agent










from which one infers that DM + 2DR = DL + DR = 2DL + DM . This leads to
DM ({L,M,R}) = 0 and DL({L,M,R}) = DR({L,M,R}) = ∆2λ . Observe that in
equilibrium coalition L and coalition R both win the contest with probability 12 ,
whereas policy M is abandoned with certainty. Imposing symmetry gives the last
row of the table.
Proof of Proposition 6.4
We first have to derive the equilibrium condition regarding the probability pi that
an i-agent initiates a SIG, i = L,M,R. We start with the condition for L-agents.
(As before, φi := (1 − pi)ni denotes the probability that coalition i is not formed.)
An L-agent is indifferent between not initiating a SIG and initiating a SIG if and




L φMφRvL(∅) + (1− φ
1− 1nL
L )φMφRvL({L}) + φ
1− 1nL
L (1− φM )φRvL({M})
+ φ
1− 1nL
L φM (1− φR)vL({R}) + (1− φ
1− 1nL




L )φM (1− φR)vL({L,R}) + φ
1− 1nL




L )(1− φM )(1− φR)vL({L,M,R}) =
φMφRvL({L}) + (1− φM )φRvL({L,M}) + φM (1− φR)vL({L,R})
+ (1− φM )(1− φR)vL({L,M,R})− λf.






(1 + φM )− (1− φM )φR + 2(1− φR)4nL
)
= F.
Exchanging the subscripts L and R results in the equilibrium condition regarding






(1 + φM )− (1− φM )φ¬i + 2(1− φ¬i)4ni
)
= F. (6.32)




M φRvM (∅) + (1− φL)φ
1− 1nM










M (1− φR)vM ({L,R}) + φL(1− φ
1− 1nM
M )(1− φR)vM ({M,R})
+ (1− φL)(1− φ
1− 1nM
M )(1− φR)vM ({L,M,R}) =
φLφRvM ({M}) + (1− φL)φRvM ({L,M}) + φL(1− φR)vM ({M,R})
+ (1− φL)(1− φR)vM ({L,M,R})− λf.










where χ := φL(1 − φR) + (1 − φL)φR is the probability that precisely one of the
extreme coalitions is formed. From (6.33) one infers that M -agents never initiate




. We know from Proposition 6.1 that if M -agents
refrain from civic action, then i-agents employ the mixed strategy solving (6.11)-
(6.12) provided F < 1− 12ni (this is inequality (6.13) evaluated at β = 0), i = L,R.
This proves the first claim.
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Note that the conditions (6.32)-(6.33) reduce to
φi(1 + φM ) = 2F, i = L,R, φMχ = 2F
as ni →∞, i = L,M,R, implying that φL = φR =: φ¯ in the limit. One easily verifies
that the system
φ¯(1 + φM ) = 2F, φM × 2φ¯(1− φ¯) = 2F
does not have a solution (φ¯, φM ) ∈ [0, 1]2. The second claim now follows from the
continuity of the left-hand sides of (6.32)-(6.33) in nL, nM , and nR.
Derivation of equation (6.16)
Using the probabilities that a specific policy is implemented in the various continu-
ation games (see Lemma 6.1), one sees that expected social welfare in continuation
game {i}, S({i}), equals
S({i}) = (1− ν)Si + νSM = −(1− ν)(1− µi + µ¬i)∆− νµ∆, i = L,R,
whereas if both coalitions are formed social welfare is
S({L,R}) = 1
2
(1− ν2)SL + 12(1− ν
2)SR + ν2SM = ν2(1− µ)∆−∆.
Lastly, if neither coalition is formed, then social welfare is S(∅) = −µ∆ = W (∅).
Note that S({L}) + S({R}) = −2(1 − ν)∆ − 2νµ∆. This expression and the fact
that Di({i}) = ∆λ ν(1− ν), i = L,R, yields
W ({L}) +W ({R}) = 2
(α
λ
ν(1− ν)− (1− ν)− νµ
)
∆.




(1− ν2)− 1 + ν2(1− µ)
)
∆.
















× ν2 = −(ν+F )2. (6.34)
























∆(1− ν − F )((1 + ν)z − (2 + z)F ). (6.35)
Adding (6.34) times µ∆ to (6.35) yields the desired result.
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Proof of Proposition 6.5
Differentiating (6.16) with respect to ν and dividing the result by ∆ yields the
FOC:
−(1 + ν)z + (2 + z)F + z(1− ν − F )− 2µ(ν + F ) = 0,
from which (6.17) follows. This number is only optimal if the SOC holds, i.e. if z >
−µ. The subgame starting after P sets ν = ν∗ has the unique symmetric equilibrium
presented in Proposition 6.1 only if Condition 6.1 and the inequalities (6.13) hold.
Condition 6.1 for ν = ν∗ reads ν∗ < 1. Taking the limit as ni → ∞, i = L,R,
of the inequalities (6.13) and evaluating the result in ν = ν∗ gives ν∗ < 1 − F , a
restriction which is more difficult to satisfy than the restriction ν∗ < 1. Obviously,



































× 1 + z
(µ+ z)2
f2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.6



























(1− ν2) = ∆
λ
(
(1− F )2 − ν2).
Since S =W − αD, one has:
S =
[





(1− F )2 − ν2)]
=∆z
(
(1− F )2 − ν2)− 2∆(1− ν − F )F −∆µ(ν + F )2 −∆(1 + z)((1− F )2 − ν2)
=∆F 2 −∆ + ∆ν2 + 2∆νF −∆µ(ν + F )2 = −∆ + ∆(1− µ)(ν + F )2,
yielding, after inserting ν = ν∗, the desired expression. The comparative static
results with respect to ∆, f , and 1/λ are trivial. Lastly:
∂S∗
∂z






F 2 < 0.
Derivation of equations (6.20)
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Suppose that nL > nR. We have to consider eight possible configurations of can-
didates: one with zero candidates, three with one candidate, three with two can-
didates, and one with three candidates. Observe that in the latter the 0-candidate
wins the election because R-agents vote strategically for this candidate provided
nL < nM + nR, i.e. provided µL < 12 . The winner of an election in which a candi-
date runs unopposed is obvious. An L-candidate only wins a two-candidate election
when his opponent is an R-candidate, other two-candidate elections are won by an
M -candidate. These observations lead to the following expected utility of an L-agent
who opts not to run for office should the strategies of all other agents be dictated






L ψM (1− ψR)∆− ψ
1− 1nL




L )(1− ψM )ψR∆− ψ
1− 1nL




L )(1− ψM )(1− ψR)∆,
The expected utility of this agent if she does become a candidate reads:
−(1− ψM )ψR∆− (1− ψM )(1− ψR)∆− λc.
Equating the above two expected utilities and rewriting results in the equilibrium














If an M -agent becomes a candidate, then she is certain to win the election. The
expected utility of an M -agent who becomes a candidate is thus simply −λc. The
equilibrium condition for M -agents mentioned in (6.20) immediately follows. Finally,
an R-agent who is not a candidate has an expected utility of
− ψLψMψ
1− 1nR
R ∆− 2(1− ψL)ψMψ
1− 1nR
R ∆− ψL(1− ψM )ψ
1− 1nR
R ∆
− (1− ψL)(1− ψM )ψ
1− 1nR
R ∆− 2(1− ψL)ψM (1− ψ
1− 1nR
R )∆
− ψL(1− ψM )(1− ψ
1− 1nR
R )∆− (1− ψL)(1− ψM )(1− ψ
1− 1nR
R )∆.
If this agents is a candidate, then her expected utility equals
−2(1− ψL)ψM∆− ψL(1− ψM )∆− (1− ψL)(1− ψM )∆− λc.
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Equating the last two expressions yields the last equilibrium condition given in
(6.20).
Proof of Proposition 6.7
Consider the case nL > nR. With a large population the equilibrium values of ψL,
ψM , and ψR solve
ψLψM (2− ψR) = C, ψM (1− 13ψLψR) = C, ψRψMψL = C.
The first and the last equality can only hold simultaneously if ψR = 1. One easily
verifies that the first two equalities (i.e. the equalities which must hold if L-agents
and M -agents do not use a pure strategy) are solved uniquely by (ψL, ψM ) = (34 ,
4
3C)
if ψR = 1. These numbers are sound probabilities as long as C ≤ 34 , proving the first
bullet point.
The three conditions cannot hold simultaneously if C > 34 , implying that at most
two types of agents become candidates with positive probability. Three possible cases
thus need to be considered: If we exclude R-agents from being candidates (ψR = 1),
then (ψL, ψM ) = (C, 1) is the only feasible solution (recall that the condition for i-
agents need not hold with equality if ψi = 1), for the solution (ψL, ψM ) = (1, 32C) is
not an element of the unit square if C > 34 . If one imposes ψM = 1, then one arrives
at the same feasible solution. The other possibility, (ψL, ψR) = (1, C), does not
constitute equilibrium strategies, because ψL = 1 is not a best response to ψR = C.
In the last case (ψL = 1), the remaining conditions are solved by (ψM , ψR) = (43C,
3
4 ),




R) = (C, 1, 1).
The case nR > nL mirrors the above analysis.
